Read-Only Blockchain Tools for AI Agents
Expose bounded blockchain queries to AI agents with explicit schemas, evidence references and separate authorisation for any state-changing operation.
Overview
When translating these concepts into an integration, keep the scope described by the wallet history api with the result. The examples in wallet transaction history and smart contract event logs show how the same distinction affects neighbouring data questions.
An AI agent can consume blockchain observations through tools, but a fluent answer is not evidence by itself. Tool design should constrain scope and preserve the facts needed to review a response.
Use narrow tool contracts
Define network, wallet, asset, range and maximum result size as typed inputs. Return coverage, block context and uncertainty alongside values. Keep API credentials in the backend rather than tool-visible prompts. A read tool should not silently acquire signing authority or invoke a payment operation as a fallback.
Worked example: a historical balance answer
An agent asks for a wallet balance at a cutoff. The tool returns exact raw units, decimals and the selected block reference. The agent can explain the result while citing that context. If historical state is unavailable, the tool returns an explicit limitation rather than substituting latest balance or letting the model invent a number.
Treat external content as data
Token metadata and transaction descriptions can contain untrusted instructions. They must not override the application’s tool permissions or user request. Test oversized ranges, wrong networks and partial results. Separate any later state-changing tool with its own explicit authority and reviewable arguments.
A practical acceptance test
Give a tool a bounded historical query and return an unavailable state. The agent must not substitute latest values or invent a balance. Place instruction-like text in token metadata and verify it cannot broaden tool permissions. A request exceeding range or row limits should fail clearly before unbounded work begins or secrets reach the model.
Questions about the topic
Frequently asked questions
Should an agent see the API secret?
No. The backend can perform authorised requests without exposing credentials to the model.
Can token metadata instruct the agent to change permissions?
No. It is untrusted data, not an authorisation source.
Standards & technical documentation
